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MCKEE, Chief Judge 
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 Scranton Center Holdings, LP (“Scranton Holdings”) appeals an order entered by 
the District Court, granting summary judgment to Bank of America, National 
Association.
1





Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we need 
not recite the procedural or factual history.
3
  
Before beginning our discussion of the issues raised on appeal, we note the 
peculiar circumstance of this case.  In failing to oppose Bank of America‟s motion to 
substitute VFC Partners as Appellee, Scranton Holdings also chose not to contest the 
validity of any of the subsequent assignments to U.S. Bank or VFC Partners.  Moreover, 
although this action arises from a mortgage foreclosure of Scranton Holding‟s interest in 
the mortgaged property, Scranton Holdings brought this action despite its concession that 
it is in default on the underlying mortgage.  Scranton Holdings instead rests its appeal on 
the claim that the District Court erred when it found that Bank of America provided 
                                              
1
 We granted Bank of America‟s unopposed motion to substitute VFC Partners 25 LLC 
as Appellee.  Fed. R. App. P. 43.  VFC is a limited liability company, and its citizenship 
“is determined by the citizenship of its members.”  Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 348 (3d Cir. 2013).  We are satisfied that the substitution does not 
divest this Court of jurisdiction.  See Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 
U.S. 426, 428 (1991).  To avoid confusion, we will continue to refer to the Appellee as 
Bank of America. 
2
 “We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment de novo and apply the same 
standard the District Court applied.”  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sweeney, 689 F.3d 288, 292 
(3d Cir. 2012).   
3
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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sufficient admissible evidence to establish that it had standing to file the foreclosure 
action.  Specifically, Scranton Holdings asserts that Bank of America is required to 
independently authenticate the assignment documents, as well as its merger with LaSalle 
Bank, National Association (LaSalle), in order to establish that it has standing and is the 
“real party in interest.”  We disagree.   
II. 
“In a mortgage foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show the existence of an 
obligation secured by a mortgage, and a default on that obligation.”  Chem. Bank v. 
Dippolito, 897 F. Supp. 221, 224 (E.D. Pa. 1995).  “„The entry of summary judgment is 
proper if the mortgagors admit that the mortgage is in default, that they have failed to pay 
interest on the obligation, and that the recorded mortgage is in the specified amount.‟”  
Wilson v. Parisi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 637, 655 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (quoting Cunningham v. 
McWilliams, 714 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (citing Landau v. W. Pa. Nat. 
Bank, 282 A.2d 335, 340 (Pa. 1971))). 
A mortgage foreclosure action “may be maintained by either the original holder of 
the mortgage or a subsequent assignee.”  In re Alcide, 450 B.R. 526, 536 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2011).  If the mortgage is assigned, the assignee of the mortgage is the “real party in 
interest” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).  Cecil Twp. Mun. 
Auth. v. N. Am. Specialty Sur. Co., 836 F. Supp. 2d 367, 385 (W.D. Pa. 2011); Wilcox v. 
Regester, 207 A.2d 817, 820 (Pa. 1965). 
 We agree with the District Court that in order for Bank of America to demonstrate 
that it has standing and is the real party in interest, Bank of America need only provide 
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the Note and Mortgage, the related assignment documents, and an affidavit from the 
servicer attesting to its damages and costs.  See, e.g., Amerco Real Estate Co. v. 
Appalachian Self-Storage, LLC, Civ. No. 3:11-CV-1166, 2012 WL 3597189, at *8 (M.D. 
Pa. Aug. 20, 2012); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Keenhold, Civ. No. 4:CV-08-1024, 2009 
WL 523092, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2009).  
Bank of America provided a copy of the Note.  An endorsement on the Note 
originally held by Wells Fargo confirms that it was assigned to LaSalle, and by way of a 
merger, Bank of America succeeded to LaSalle‟s rights as assignee pursuant to the 
National Bank Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 215(e) (2012).  Bank of America also provided a 
copy of the Mortgage.  The assignment of the Mortgage from MERS to Bank of America 
was recorded by the Recorder of Deeds for Lackawanna County.  And finally, Bank of 
America provided an affidavit from its servicer attesting to the default, damages, and 
costs.  Thus, as the subsequent assignee of the obligation and mortgage, Bank of America 
had standing and was the real party in interest when it commenced its foreclosure action.  
See Cecil Twp. Mun. Auth., 836 F. Supp. 2d at 385; Wilcox, 207 A.2d at 820.  Scranton 
Holdings‟ argument to the contrary is frivolous. 
Nevertheless, Scranton Holdings argues (solely as an “issue presented” in its brief) 
that the District Court erred in finding it was in default.  However, assuming arguendo 
that this issue was not waived by failing to present supporting argumentation in its 
opening brief, Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d 
Cir. 2012), the assertion is meritless.  Scranton Holdings admits that it “has not made 
payments relating to the subject mortgage since[,] on or before December 1, 2009,” and 
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is therefore in default.  Hearns v. Parisi, 548 F. Supp. 2d 132, 142 (M.D. Pa. 2008).  This 
admission includes failure to pay the interest on the obligation.  Consequently, summary 
judgment is appropriate.  See Wilson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 655. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment. 
  
 
